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Abstract:  The 2017 Jakarta governor election had encoura-
ged polarization among Muslims, including among media 
social users: those who agreed and those who disagreed 
with voting for Basuki Ahok Tjahaja Purnama since he was 
prosecuted for allegedly committing blasphemy. This study 
has examined the cognitive pattern amongst disputants: 
whether cognitive pattern and religiosity contribute to poli-
tical disagreements or not. Participants were Indonesia’s 
Muslim social media users (N= 300). U sing multiple regres-
sion analysis, the findings have demonstrated that analytical 
thinking produces higher disagreement than holistic 
thinking. In addition, higher level of religiosity produces 
higher disagreement. 
Keywords: Indonesian Muslim, political disagreements, 
cognitive pattern, social media  
Abstrak:  Pemilihan gubernur D KI Jakarta 2017 memantik 
polarisasi di kalangan umat muslim, termasuk di kalangan 
muslim pengguna media sosial.  Ada yang setuju dan ada 
yang tidak setuju untuk memilih Basuki Ahok Tjahaja Pur-
nama sebagai gubernur. Studi ini membahas apakah pola 
kognitif dan religiusitas berkontribusi pada ketidaksepema-
haman politik; pola kognitif seperti apa (analitis atau 
holistik) yang paling banyak diikuti umat Islam? Responden 
penelitian adalah umat Islam pengguna media sosial (N  =  
300). Melalui analisis regresi berganda, studi ini menemu-
kan bahwa pola kognitif-analitis mendorong terjadinya 
political disagreement lebih tinggi daripada pola kognitif-
holistik. Selain itu, semakin tinggi tingkat religiusitas sese-
orang, maka semakin tinggi pula kemungkinan political dis-
agreement  itu terjadi. 
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Introduction 
In the realm of political behavior, a recent revival of interest in 
disagreement stems from normative theories of political deliberation 
that promote a different view of how representative democracy funct-
ions effectively. Though liberal democratic theories emphasize the need 
for individuals to be civically engaged in order to be politically active, 
deliberative theories focus on collective processes and the exchange of 
viewpoints. While theoretical discussion of deliberative democracy is 
lively and well developed, empirical scholarship on the mass public has 
focused principally on the question of the behavioral impact of 
political disagreement (Klofstad, Sokhey, & McClurg, 2012, p.1).  
Indonesia is a genuine democracy incorporating open society, re-
ligious, and ethnic pluralism. Its national motto even translates as 
‘Unity in Diversity”. For decades, it has advertised itself to the world as 
a shining example that Islam and democracy are not incompatible. But 
the bitter election campaign to choose Jakarta’s next Governor gives 
the lie to these claims, conducted as it has been in an increasingly tense 
atmosphere of religious and racial discrimination and rising intolerance 
that has seen the incumbent candidate (Ahok) accused of blasphe-
my and Islamist hard-liners charged with treason. This tense atmos-
phere also occurs in Indonesian-Muslims’ social media society, which is 
polarized into two groups: those who agree and those who disagree 
with voting for Ahok as the next Governor. Political disagreement 
produces patterns of partisan polarization by increasing negative emo-
tions (i.e., anxiety, anger) toward out-groups and out-group members 
and decreasing positive emotions (i.e., enthusiasm, hope) toward in-
groups and in-group members, such as political parties or candidates 
(Parsons, 2010).  
We suspect that Indonesian-Muslims’ social media society holds 
important potential in explaining their disagreement. Increasingly 
widespread knowledge in social media creates an explosion of informa-
tion - including misinformation, which triggers diversity in belief, 
differences in judgment, and disagreements. While some evidence sug-
gests that political discussion in social networks positively influences 
political participation (Klofstad, 2007; McClurg, 2003), others find 
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that discussion in the presence of disagreement reduces participation 
(Huckfeldt et al. 2004) and increases ambivalence. Experiencing debate 
over even the most fundamental of disagreements with a reciprocal 
exchange of views can instill a powerful sense of tolerance for those 
expressing those view, but on the other hand, exposure to disagree-
ments may also lead to intergroup conflict (Djupe & Calfano, 2012).  
In short, the consequences of everyday political disagreement 
remain unclear. Some research indicates that disagreement between 
citizens makes those in the minority less likely to vote in line with their 
underlying partisanship (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1988; Sokhey and 
McClurg 2012), that it increases opinion ambivalence (Mutz 2002b, 
2006), and that it decreases political participation (McClurg 2003; 
Mutz 2002b; 2006). Other research suggests that such findings are 
overstated either because they are conditional on other attributes of 
social networks or are nonexistent (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 
2004; McClurg 2006b; Nir 2005). Clarity about what produces such 
divergent results is needed so we can better assess how political conflict 
between individuals affects the quality of citizenship. It is in this 
intellectual context that we revisit what is meant by “everyday political 
disagreement,” that we reconsider how to measure it in the real world, 
and that we reassess its implications for empirical analyses and, ulti-
mately, democratic practice. 
This study identified the cognitive pattern among disputants 
which focused on what kind of cognitive pattern (holistic or analytical 
pattern) do Indonesian Muslims experience most? What is the religio-
sity level among disputants? Whether cognitive pattern contributes to 
political disagreements? Whether religiosity contributes to political 
disagreements? Whether seeking and sharing political updates can con-
tribute to political disagreements? 
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Everyday political disagreement refers to conver-
sations where individuals are exposed to viewpoints that 
are different from their own. Such exchanges are particu-
larly important for understanding political behavior 
because without the possibility of learning new informa-
tion or views, there is little opportunity for social com-
munication to alter past patterns of behavior. Put an-
other way, disagreement drives social influence (McPhee, 
Ferguson, and Smith, 1963; Sprague, 1982 cited in 
Klofstad, et al., 2012, p. 2). Political disagreement is also 
important because it may help us understand how 
individual preferences translate into citizen inputs into 
the political system. When there is no exchange of views 
between citizens, the lines of debate are hard and fast 
and potentially inhibit compromise among representa-
tive officials. That is, preferences are relatively fixed, and 
the ability of governments to provide representation 
becomes largely a function of institutional design (Dahl, 
1963). Yet when there is some exchange of views bet-
ween citizens, public representation becomes a matter 
not just of how we aggregate preferences through institu-
tions, but of how the public reacts to different view-
points and adjusts its own behavior. For example, if 
conflicting views create intolerance for others’ preferen-
ces, it can delegitimize governing elites who do not share 
the ideas of majorities. Or, if conflict causes some groups 
of voters (e.g., majority opinion holders) to express their 
opinions more insistently and to participate more than 
other groups (e.g., minority opinion holders), then go-
vernment may be more responsive to some groups than 
others (Noelle-Neuman, 1993). It is also possible that 
disagreement affects preferences themselves, suggesting 
that what is in the public’s interest is a dynamic pheno-
menon that changes as we deliberate, potentially leading 
to “better” public opinion and policy outputs (Fishkin, 
Literature 
Review 
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1995). Accordingly, there is acute interest in how much disagreement 
occurs between citizens in their everyday lives. Yet in what has become 
a hallmark of this literature, even the basic question of how much 
disagreement exists between citizens is itself contested. For example, 
Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2004) have argued that disagree-
ment is the modal condition in the American electorate (based upon 
average network size and various probabilities of disagreement between 
any two members). Conversely, Mutz (2006) makes an argument for 
low levels of disagreement. She notes that not only are levels of dis-
agreement between dyads very low in national probability samples, but 
that levels of communication in those dyads a real so exceptionally low. 
Inshort, despite examining similar data, Mutz and Huckfeldt and 
colleagues draw largely opposite conclusions. 
Almost all political science studies of everyday political disagree-
ment employ measurements that focus on some aspect of discussion 
occurring across lines of political difference. However, this is where 
agreement about disagreement ends. The basic theoretical question is 
as follows: at what point do political conversations become disagreeable 
and start affecting political behavior? This point is illustrated by 
contrasting the measures used in two of the most cited studies in the 
field: Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague’s (2004) Political Disagree-
ment, and Mutz’s (2006) Hearing the Other Side. Defining the 
underlying concept of disagreement is not the main thrust of either 
study. However, their different measurement strategies reflect distinct 
theoretical predilections in turn, these bracket the potential range of 
conceptual definitions that could be used to derive measurements of 
disagreement. By bringing such predilections to the forefront, we can 
bring order to this literature, point to a venues for further research, and 
more generally, make further progress in understanding the role that 
political disagreement plays in American civil society.  
Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague measure disagreement as dis-
cord in the vote choice of a respondent and her discussant. In this 
approach, a person who prefers one presidential candidate encounters 
disagreement even if his or her discussant prefers no presidential 
candidate. There are many conceptual benefits to such a measurement 
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approach: it is anchored in political preferences, it is about an indivi-
dual’s perceptions of his or her communication environment, and we 
have a very good sense of what the disagreement is about (i.e., a can-
didate, even if we do not know specifics about issue content). At the 
same time, this measurement maybe more appropriately conceive do 
fast measuring the absence of agreement rather than the presence of 
disagreement. In turn, this may overstate the importance of social 
exchanges with low political salience; that is, exchanges that do not 
really create the pronounced opportunities for learning that are central 
to theories of disagreement and deliberative democracy. In this sense, 
the underlying concept emphasizes a measure that is anchored in 
preferences that are relatively concrete, but exchanges that have mi-
nimal conflict, and thus may not always be perceived clearly or judged 
to be salient by the parties in the exchange (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 
1988; Mutz and Martin, 2001). 
Mutz seeks to measure survey respondents’ perceptions of how 
much they disagree with their named discussants. Specifically, her 
approach is to create an index of disagreement that combines informa-
tion from a variety of survey questions, including shared vote preferen-
ces, shared partisan preferences, general perceptions of disagreement, 
general perceptions of shared opinions, and levels/ frequencies of 
disagreement. The strength of this measure is that it does not rely 
solely on vote choice for determining whether disagreement may exist; 
it instead focuses on the respondents’ explicit recognition of disagree-
ment during social exchanges. Another potential strength is that this 
approach measures exposure to disagreement by including the frequen-
cy of political discussion in the index, rather than assuming that 
disagreement is not reliant on frequency of interaction. Unlike the 
Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague measure, this one is weighted toward 
more intense disagreements. As a consequence, we argue that Mutz’s 
approach potentially overlooks what we see as the more common, but 
less intense, discussions in which differing viewpoints are exchanged. 
These two approaches give us insight into the deeper theoretical 
problem surrounding everyday political disagreement. At question is 
both presence and degree that is, what constitutes disagreement in a 
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network, and given that condition, how do we gauge “amount”? If we 
conceptualize a hypothetical conversation between two people, we 
could classify any political discussion they have as falling between two 
possible endpoints: complete agreement or complete disagreement 
about politics. From this, we can then begin to think about the point 
at which a conversation is best characterized as being agreeable or 
disagreeable. 
Cultural psychologists have consistently found different patterns 
of thinking and perception in different societies, with some cultures 
demonstrating a more analytic pattern and others a more holistic pat-
tern. Analytic cognition is characterized by taxonomic and rule-based 
categorization of objects, a narrow focus in visual attention, dispose-
tional bias in causal attribution, and the use of formal logic in reason-
ning. In contrast, holistic cognition is characterized by thematic and 
family-resemblance-based categorization of objects, a focus on contex-
tual information and relationships in visual attention, an emphasis on 
situational causes in attribution, and dialecticism (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, 
& Norenzayan, 2001). What unites the elements of the analytic style is 
a tendency to focus on a single dimension or aspect—whether in 
categorizing objects or evaluating arguments—and a tendency to dis-
entangle phenomena from the contexts in which they are embedded—
for example, focusing on the individual as a causal agent or attending 
to focal objects in visual scenes. What unites the elements of the 
holistic style is a broad attention to context and relationships in visual 
attention, categorizing objects, and explaining social behavior. 
Four domains as the essential constructs of the analytic–holistic 
thinking dimension: locus of attention (parts vs. whole), causal theory 
(dispositional vs. interactional), perception of change (linear vs. cyclic), 
and attitude toward contradictions (formal logic vs. naïve dialecticism). 
Analytic-Holistic (AH) thinking, in particular, appears to influence 
information selection, attribution, and ultimately, sense making (Hua, 
2017).  
The culture and cognition literature, which has focused largely on 
elucidating East–West variation in basic cognition (i.e., thinking styles 
and lay belief systems), has characterized East Asian thought as empha-
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sizing holistic thinking and Western thought as emphasizing 
analytical thinking. Holistic and analytical thinking can be 
conceptuallized as broad, overarching interpretive constructs or 
“cultural syndromes” (Triandis, 1995) that can help illuminate 
behavior both across and within cultures (Kashima, 2009). 
Holism is a loose association of cognitive tendencies or lay be-
liefs that is more frequently found in East Asian than in West-
ern cultures and that perhaps can be depicted best by the 
yin/yang symbol (Rodgers, 2010).  
Regarding perception of change, holistic thinkers are more 
likely to expect constant change due to the complex interactions 
between phenomena while analytic thinkers are more likely to 
believe that the future is predictable and that phenomena will 
proceed in similar patterns as they have in the past (Peng & 
Nisbett, 1999). For instance, if the value of a stock is decrea-
sing, an analytic thinker will be more likely to believe that the 
value will continue to decrease over time. Finally, holistic 
thinkers are more tolerant towards contradictions. They are 
more likely to accept that two seemingly contradictory propo-
sitions could be simultaneously true and even complementary 
to each other while analytic thinkers are more likely to feel that 
only one proposition can be true at a time. 
Analytic style correlate to independent: freedom of thin-
king, freedom of expression (agree and or disagree expression). 
Holistic style correlate to interdependent: collectivism, harmo-
ny, socially engage, which prevent or avoid disagreement and 
conflict. Hypothesis1: analytical thinking produce higher disag-
reement than holistical thinking. Hypothesis 2: Does Religio-
sity predict low level or high level of disagreement? Religion 
related to peace, acceptance, respect, harmony. Religious per-
sons tend to be uncompromising; religion as a source of conflict 
(Brahm, 2005). 
 
Participants are Indonesian-Muslim social media users 
(N=390). Participants are come from different kind of ethnic 
Methodology 
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groups, such Javanese (37.7%), Sundanese (23.1%), Minang (10.3%), 
etc as we can see in Table 1. 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
Jawa 147 37.7 37.7 37.7 
Sunda 90 23.1 23.1 60.8 
minang 40 10.3 10.3 71.0 
betawi 69 17.7 17.7 88.7 
Batak 11 2.8 2.8 91.5 
melayu 15 3.8 3.8 95.4 
Bugis 11 2.8 2.8 98.2 
lainnya 7 1.8 1.8 100.0 
Total 390 100.0 100.0  
Table 1 ‘Ethnic group data’ 
 
In the beginning of the questionnaire, we also deliver a question: 
“during the last six months, did you talk with anyone in social media 
about government or elections?”  
Instruments: (1) The Centrality of Religiosity Scale by Huber & 
Huber (2012), (2) Cognitive Pattern Scale by Varnum et al (2010), (3) 
Political Disagreements (Klofstad, Sokhey & McClurg, 2012). 
The Centrality of Religiosity Scale (CRS) by Huber & Huber 
(2012). The Centrality of Religiosity Scale (CRS) is a measure of the 
centrality, importance or salience of religious meanings in personality. 
It has been developed by Huber and has yet been applied in more than 
100 studies in sociology of religion, psychology of religion and reli-
gious studies in 25 countries with in total more than 100,000 partici-
pants. The largest single application is in the global religion monitor 
with representative samples in 21 countries However, no comprehend-
sive overview on the scale comprising a base for its practical application 
is yet available in English. The present paper aims to close this deside-
ratum. It consists of four parts: first we introduce the basic ideas and 
construction principles of the CRS, second we sketch the model of reli-
giosity on which the CRS is based on. Third, we provide a taxonomy 
of the different versions of the CRS. Finally, norm values from 21 na-
tions are provided. 
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Dimension Items for both the basic and interreligious versions 
Basic CRS versions Additional Items for the interreligious versions 
only Interreligious CRSi versions: 
a. Intellect 01: How often do you think about religious issues?  
b. Ideology 02: To what extent do you believe that God or something 
divine exists? 
c. Public practice 03: How often do you take part in religious 
services?  
d. Private practice 04: How often do you pray? 04b: How often do 
you meditate? 
e. Experience 05: How often do you experience situations in which 
you have the feeling that God or something divine intervenes in 
your life? 05b: How often do you experience situations in which 
you have the feeling that you are in one with all?  
f. Intellect 06: How interested are you in learning more about 
religious topics? Ideology 07: To what extend do you believe in an 
afterlife—e.g. immortality of the soul, resurrection of the dead or 
reincarnation?  
g. Public practice 08: How important is to take part in religious 
services?  
h. Private practice 09: How important is personal prayer for you? 
09b: How important is meditation for you?  
i. Experience 10: How often do you experience situations in which 
you have the feeling that God or something divine wants to 
communicate or to reveal something to you? 10b: How often do 
you experience situations in which you have the feeling that you 
are touched by a divine power?  
j. Intellect 11: How often do you keep yourself informed about 
religious questions through radio, television, internet, newspapers, 
or books?  
k. Ideology 12: In your opinion, how probable is it that a higher 
power really exists Public practice 13: How important is it for you 
to be connected to a religious community?  
Indonesian Muslims’ Cognitive Pattern  
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l. Private practice 14: How often do you pray spontaneously when 
inspired by daily situations? 14b: How often do you try to connect 
to the divine spontaneously when inspired by daily situations?  
m. Experience 15: How often do you experience situations in which 
you have the feeling that God or something divine is present? 
 
The cognitive pattern scale was adapted from Varnum, et.al 
(2010), which divided cognitive pattern as analytic and holistic. 
Analytic cognition is characterized by (1) taxonomic and rule-based 
categorization of objects, (2) a narrow focus in visual attention, (3) 
dispositional bias in causal attribution, and (4) the use of formal logic 
in reasoning. Holistic cognition is characterized by (1) thematic and 
family-resemblance- based categorization of objects, (2) a focus on 
contextual information and relationships in visual attention, (3) an 
emphasis on situational causes in attribution, and (4) dialecticism. 
 
 
Analytic cognition Holistic cognition 
Field independent Field dependent 
Narrow Broad 
Focus on salient objects with intent 
to manipulate them 
Focus on relationship of elements, 
background 
Taxonomic, focus on a single dimension 
or shared property 
Thematic, focus on functional 
relationship or overall similarity 
Dispositional Situational 
Traits and attributes of individuals 
determine events 
External forces, context, and situations 
determine events 
Analytic Dialectical 
Use of formal logic Middle Way philosophy 
Trends continue Trend reversals are likely 
Table 2 ‘The cognitive pattern scale’ 
 
Political Disagreement: the respondent’s perception of how much 
disagreement is occurring in his or her network (Klofstad, Sokhey & 
McClurg, 2012): (1) disagree with others’ political choice, (2) disagree 
related to ethnic/religious discrimination, (3) disagree related to fake 
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news, or an instance of defamation. We use path analysis to 
analyze the data. 
 
This research shows us that 64.9% respondents have an 
analytic pattern of cognition, while 35.1 % have a holistic 
cognition, as mentioned in Table 3 and Table 4. 





390 10.85 67.95 50.0000 8.75426 
Political 
Disagreement 
390 19.83 61.94 50.0000 9.63833 
Religiousity 390 10.34 65.23 50.0000 9.35002 
Valid N 
(listwise) 390     
Table 3 ‘Descriptive statistics’ 
 
 





Low 137 35.1 35.1 35.1 
High 253 64.9 64.9 100.0 
Total 390 100.0 100.0  
Table 4 ‘Categorization of cognitive pattern’ 
 
Meanwhile, we can also see the political disagreement score 
from the Table 5. Most respondent have higher political disag-
reement score (62.3%), and 37.7% experience low political 
disagreement. Respondent also have high religiosity score 









low 147 37.7 37.7 37.7 
high 243 62.3 62.3 100.0 
Total 390 100.0 100.0  
Table 5 ‘Political disagreement score’ 
Finding and 
Discussions 
Indonesian Muslims’ Cognitive Pattern  
Jurnal Komunikasi Islam |  V olume 08, N omor 01, Juni 2018 |  13 
Table 6 ‘Religiosity score’ 
 
Model Summary 




Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .291a .085 .080 9.24414 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Religiosity, Cognitive Pattern 
Tabel 7 ‘Model summary’ 
 
Moreover, from the Table 8 we can see that religiosity and cogni-
tive pattern predict political disagreement about 85%.  
 
ANOVAa 






Regression 3066.354 2 1533.177 17.942 .000b 
Residual 33070.767 387 85.454   
Total 36137.122 389    
a. Dependent Variable: Political Disagreement 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Religiosity, Cognitive Pattern 
Table 8 ‘Religiosity and cognitive pattern predict political disagreement’ 
 
From the Table 9 we can see cognitive pattern 0.179, t-value 
3.592, sig.= 0.000 (sig<0.05), more higher cognitive pattern (analyti-
cal) predict higher score in political disagreement. In religiosity varia-
ble, coefficients is 0.239, t-value=4.719, sig=0.000, a person with a 










low 132 33.8 33.8 33.8 
high 258 66.2 66.2 100.0 
Total 390 100.0 100.0  
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B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 40.123 2.791  14.376 .000 
Cognitive 
Pattern 
.198 .055 .179 3.592 .000 
2 
(Constant) 31.459 3.280  9.592 .000 
Cognitive 
Pattern 
.125 .056 .113 2.236 .026 
Religiosity .246 .052 .239 4.719 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Political Disagreement 
Table 9’ Analysis of variance religiosity and cognitive pattern to political disagreement’ 
 
 
Figure 1 ‘Path analysis’ 
 
 
Path Estimate S.E. Z-Value P-Value  





3,163 0,002 Sig 
Religiosity to 












Cognitive Pattern 0,253 
0,06
5 
3,886 0,000 Sig 
Table 10 ‘Path analysis for religiosity and cognitive pattern to political disagreement’ 
 
From the statistical analysis described in Picture 1 and Table 9, 
this study revealed the more analytic and religious a person, the more 
disagree would be. It might means that religious and analytic person 
may experience political disagreements more than those who are holis-
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tic and low religious. Moreover, Mutz (2002) stated that disagreement 
in social networks leads people to deliberate, but not participate.  
The findings accepted hypothesis 1, namely analytical thinking 
produce higher disagreement than holistic thinking. Also this study 
accepted hypothesis 2: higher level of religiosity produce higher dis-
agreement. The more religious, the more possible to possess/express 
disagreement. It is in line with Terror Management Theory (TMT) 
(Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991) which proposes that cul-
tural worldviews, such as those in religions, protect people from 
thoughts of death. When those worldviews (or religious beliefs) are 
threatened, that makes people think about death and thinking about 
death is an unpleasant experience. That unpleasant experience leads 
people to cling more strongly to their worldviews and religious beliefs 
(Schimel, Hayes, Williams, & Jahrig, 2007). Since the scale looked at 
the centrality of religiosity, those who reported higher levels of 
religiosity view religion as more central to their lives and thus political 
disagreement could be viewed by them as extremely threatening to 
them. Basically, anything that goes against their beliefs would be 
viewed as a threat and the response could be a disagreement on social 
media.  
Related to the religiousity scale that we used in the research, that 
developed by Huber and Huber, measures the centrality of religiosity. 
The scale does not give any indication of type of religiosity (such as 
extrinsic or extrinsic). This could be considered as a limitation of the 
research. 
Disagreements do not always contribute to conflict; with-
out legitimate mechanisms for religious groups to express their views 
(disagreements), they may be more likely to resort to conflict and or 
violence. More analytic leads to higher level of religiosity and lead mo-
re disagreements. Some suggestion for further research: does analytical 
person feel more threatened? Whether if a person can deal with that 
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Conclusion 
From this study, we found that when social media users use the 
analytical thinking more frequent, they may possess higher disagree-
ment in social media, especially when they engage in a political discus-
sion. While the holistic thinker possess less disagreements. This fin-
dings can be beneficial for politicians who searching a follower. A per-
son with a holistic thinker pattern is the best person to persuade. 
Holistic cognition is characterized by (1) thematic and family-resem-
blance-based categorization of objects, (2) a focus on contextual 
information and relationships in visual attention, (3) an emphasis on 
situational causes in attribution, and (4) dialecticism. 
Another finding are higher level of religiosity may lead to higher 
disagreement. In another word, the more religious the more possible to 
possess or express disagreement. The recommendation from this point 
are: unsuggestable to use a religious issues to be spread in social media. 
Since a religious person already has a potention to disagree, and when 
they stimulate by a kind of religious issues, may lead to stimulate a 
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